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INTRODUCTION 
Native American tribes occupy a unique position in the 
legal, social, and economic fabric of American society; they 
are simultaneously independent sovereigns and dependent 
domestic nations.  Indian nations have the power to structure 
their governments, courts and laws. This authority, however, 
is subject to limitations by Congress and oversight by 
executive agencies.  Many historical and contemporary 
controversies arise from the tension between these principles, 
particularly in the context of tribal membership.  This 
Comment discusses one such controversy surrounding an 
August 2011 decision by the Cherokee Nation Supreme 
Court.  The decision upheld a referendum requiring Cherokee 
Indian ancestry for tribal membership, which consequently 
stripped 2800 former Cherokee slaves, known as Cherokee 
Freedmen, of their citizenship status in the Cherokee Nation. 
This shift toward blood quanta requirements for tribal 
membership is a trend among several Native tribes, signaling 
a reassertion of tribal sovereignty.1
In this specific case, the importance of protecting the 
Cherokee Freedmen from unjust removal based on race alone 
  In most of these cases, as 
in the Cherokee Nation controversy, the federal government 
also asserts its authority to oversee tribal affairs.  The result 
is an ongoing struggle to define the appropriate role for the 
federal government in Indian matters—one that preserves 
tribes’ right to self-determination, while also protecting 
individual tribal members from violations of their 
fundamental rights. 
 
 1.  The blood quantum requirement refers to legislation enacted in the 
United States to define membership in Native Tribes.  See Paul Spruhan, A 
Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian Law to 1935, 51 S.D. L. REV. 
1, 1–3 & nn. 1, 2, 5, 6 (2006).  Blood quantum describes the degree of ancestry 
for an individual of a particular ethnic or racial group.  Id. at 1. 
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outweighs the preservation of tribal sovereignty.  Federal 
involvement is necessary to ensure reinstatement of the 
Cherokee Freedmen’s citizenship status.  A paradigmatic 
shift in the definition of Indian, however, is required to find a 
balance between sovereignty and dependence.  Not until the 
federal government and, as a result, Indian nations redefine 
Indian in nonracial terms will these race-based controversies 
cease. 
This Comment begins in Part I.A with a discussion of the 
fundamental principles of Indian Law, namely tribal 
sovereignty and the federal government’s oversight role.  The 
Comment outlines the foundation for tribal independence, as 
well as the plenary powers of Congress and the authority of 
the Executive Branch as it pertains to tribal sovereignty.  The 
Comment continues by discussing civil rights as applied to 
Indian nations, as well as deferential judicial review of 
decisions by executive agencies regarding native tribes. 
In Part I.B, this Comment addresses both native and 
federal control of tribal membership.  Subsequently, this 
section discusses the various ways in which the federal 
government and Native tribes define Indian.  Then, in Part 
I.C, the Comment provides a brief history of the Cherokee 
Freedmen.  Part I.D provides an account of the events 
culminating in the current Cherokee Freedmen controversy, 
and Part I.E concludes the Background Section with an 
overview of current scholarly and popular opinion about the 
controversy.  In Part II, the Comment outlines the legal 
problem, and in its analysis in Part III, the Comment argues 
that all the available legal avenues would not adequately 
remedy the Cherokee Freedmen’s plight.  Finally, the 
Comment concludes with a proposal in Part IV that calls for 
federal intervention, but more importantly, a redefinition of 
Indian using nonracial factors. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Principles of Indian Law that Inform Federal-Tribal 
Relations 
Federal Indian law derives in many respects from three 
foundational cases decided by Chief Justice John Marshall:2
 
 2. Greg Rubio, Reclaiming Indian Civil Rights: The Application of 
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McIntosh v. Johnson,3 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,4 and 
Worcester v. Georgia.5  The Marshall trilogy establishes two 
fundamental principles: the independent, sovereign nature of 
Native tribes and the federal government’s responsibility to 
protect the tribes.6  Despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding 
in Worcester that states have no authority over Indian 
matters, no similar decision shelters Native tribes from 
federal control.7  Thus, while Native tribes have the authority 
to structure their governments, they are limited by 
Congress’s plenary powers over their affairs.8  The 
contradictory juxtaposition of these two notions of Native 
tribes—as dependent and helpless on the one hand and 
distinct, independent political nations on the other—is at the 
root of myriad historical and contemporary Native conflicts.9
1. Tribal Sovereignty 
 
Due to their inherent tribal sovereignty prior to contact 
with European nations, Indian tribes are considered “distinct, 
independent political communities”10 capable of exercising 
self-government.11  The U.S. Constitution, various statutes, 
treaties, and court decisions recognize these preexisting 
powers of self-government.12  Encompassed in tribes’ 
independent status is immunity from suit.13  This 
foundational principle protects Indian tribes’ right to exercise 
independent power in their decision making.14
 
International Human Rights Law to Tribal Disenrollment Actions, 11 OR. REV. 
INT’L L. 1, 12 (2009).  
  For example, 
tribal governments have the authority to structure their court 
systems, craft and apply civil and criminal codes, and define 
 3. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).  
 4. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).  
 5. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).  
 6. Rubio, supra note 2, at 14. 
 7. Id. at 13.  
 8. See Terrion L. Williamson, The Plight of “Nappy-Headed” Indians: The 
Role of Tribal Sovereignty in the Systematic Discrimination Against Black 
Freedmen by the Federal Government and Native American Tribes, 10 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 233, 247–48 (2004).  
 9. See Rubio, supra note 2, at 12–13. 
 10. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559.  
 11. FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 205 
(Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005). 
 12. Id.  
 13. See Williamson, supra note 8, at 247.  
 14. Id. 
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tribal membership or citizenship.15  Subject to tribes’ consent 
to waiver or express waiver from Congress, sovereign 
immunity serves as grounds for dismissal of any cases parties 
bring against tribal nations.16  This forces any potential 
parties to seek redress in tribal courts.17
Immunity from suit is an “integral part” of protecting 
tribes’ independence and survival.
 
18  If tribes had to pay 
damages to aggrieved parties, they would deplete community 
treasuries and potentially impair the tribes’ ability to perform 
their governmental duties.19  Yet, sovereign immunity has 
simultaneously detrimental effects for petitioning parties that 
sue tribal nations—it forces those parties to seek redress in 
tribal courts alone.20  Obtaining relief from a court that is 
invested in protecting the independent sovereignty of its 
nation, however, is likely to prove difficult for aggrieved 
parties.21  Therefore, while tribal sovereign immunity 
preserves the sanctity of tribal independence, it also has the 
effect in certain circumstances of leaving injured parties 
without redress.22
2. The Plenary Powers of Congress and the Power of the 
Executive Branch 
 
Congress exercises broad authority over Indian nations,23 
and it is Congress alone that has the power to limit and 
restrain Indian tribal power.24  Congress derives its plenary 
power from three clauses in the Constitution25: the Indian 
Commerce Clause,26 the Treaty Clause,27
 
 15. Id.  
 and Supremacy 
 16. Lydia Edwards, Protecting Black Tribal Members: Is the Thirteenth 
Amendment the Linchpin to Securing Equal Rights Within Indian Country?, 8 
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 122, 136 (2006).  
 17. Id. at 137; Williamson, supra note 8 at 252–53.  
 18. Edwards, supra note 16, at 137; see also Williamson, supra note 8 at 
247.  
 19. Edwards, supra note 16, at 138.  
 20. See id.  
 21. See Williamson, supra note 8, at 252–53.  
 22. See id.  
 23. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978) (“Congress’ 
authority over Indian matters is extraordinarily broad, and the role of courts in 
adjusting relations between and among tribes and their members 
correspondingly restrained.”).  
 24. Williamson, supra note 8, at 257.  
 25. Id.   
 26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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Clause.28  Therefore, tribal sovereignty “ ‘ exists only at the 
sufferance of Congress,’ ” 29 and any changes to federal-tribal 
relations are within Congress’ domain alone.30  Though there 
may be certain limitations on Congress’ plenary power over 
tribal nations, the Supreme Court has upheld every act of 
Congress pertaining to an Indian tribe.31
Consequently, the Court has reaffirmed Congress’ 
authority to regulate nearly every aspect of Native life, 
including but not limited to: the restructuring of treaty 
agreements,
 
32 the regulation of land and water use rights,33 
the applicability of constitutional rights and provisions to 
Indian nations,34 and determinations of tribal membership.35  
Therefore, despite tribal nations’ inherent sovereignty, 
Congressional oversight and control denigrates Native 
nations to a “quasi-sovereign”36 status.37
Further establishing this “quasi-sovereign”
 
38 status, the 
Department of the Interior (DOI) and the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA) also exert a great deal of power over tribal 
affairs.39  The DOI asserts that it has “ ‘ broad and possibly 
nonreviewable authority’ to disapprove or withhold approval 
of [any] tribal constitutional amendment regarding 
membership criteria.”40
 
 27. Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
  Furthermore, tribes organized under 
 28. Id. at art. VI, cl. 2. 
 29. Christina D. Ferguson, Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo: A Modern Day 
Lesson on Tribal Sovereignty, 46 ARK. L. REV. 275, 279 (1993) (quoting United 
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)). 
 30. Williamson, supra note 8, at 257–58.  
 31. Id. at 258.  
 32. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–67 (1903). 
 33. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 
172, 175–76 (1999); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 
U.S. 800, 802–03 (1976).  
 34. See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 
441–42 (1988) (rejecting the notion that the First Amendment’s Free Exercise 
Clause applies to U.S. Forest Service’s burdening of a Native American religious 
practice); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552–54 (1974) (affirming Congress’ 
authority to exempt hiring of Native Americans by the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
from equal protection claims); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 
272, 290–91 (1955) (denying Alaska Indian tribes’ right to bring a Fifth 
Amendment takings challenge).  
 35. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978).  
 36. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).  
 37. See Williamson, supra note 8, at 258.  
 38. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208.  
 39. SHARON O’BRIEN, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS 197 (1989).  
 40. Margo S. Brownell, Note, Who Is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to 
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the Indian Reorganization Act, or the IRA, must send any 
constitutional amendments to the BIA for approval.41  As will 
be discussed in the next section, actions by the DOI and BIA 
are reviewed with great deference; hence, federal courts 
rarely overturn these two executive agencies’ decisions.42
3. Federal Judicial Review of DOI and BIA 
Determinations 
 
 Federal-tribal relations are only subject to judicial 
review as authorized by Congress.43  The Administrative 
Procedure Act of 1970 governs determinations made by the 
Department of the Interior, including the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs.44  When a court reviews an administrative decision, it 
undertakes a three step inquiry by determining: (1) whether 
the Secretary of the DOI acted within his authority; (2) 
“whether ‘the actual choice made was not arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;’ ”  and (3) whether the Secretary’s action 
“followed the necessary procedural requirements.”45
 
the Question at the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 275, 
307 (2001).  
  The 
 41. Williamson, supra note 8, at 258.  
 42. See id.  
 43. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903).  
 44. Seminole Nation of Okla. v. Norton, 223 F. Supp. 2d 122, 130 (D.D.C. 
2002).  The Administrative Procedure Act provides in relevant part:  
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional 
and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of 
the terms of an agency action.  The reviewing court shall—(1) compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (2) 
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions 
found to be—(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional 
right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (D) 
without observance of procedure required by law; (E) unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this 
title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided 
by statute; or (F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts 
are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.  In making the 
foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or 
those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the 
rule of prejudicial error.  
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). 
 45. Norton, 223 F. Supp. 2d at 131 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton 
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416–17 (1971) (internal quotation marks 
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court cannot supplant the decision of the agency with its own 
judgment; as long as the agency articulates a rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made, the 
court will defer to the agency.46
Seminole Nation of Oklahoma v. Norton
 
47 is one case that 
illustrates federal judicial deference to DOI and BIA actions.  
In facts somewhat analogous to the Cherokee Nation case 
that is subject of this Comment, the Seminole Nation held a 
referendum election including several proposed constitutional 
amendments designed to exclude the Freedmen from 
membership in the tribe.48  The DOI Assistant Secretary 
stated in a letter that he would not approve the constitutional 
amendments because they were intended to exclude the 
Freedmen and they were not sent to the DOI for approval.49  
Despite these warnings, the Seminole Nation subsequently 
held an election where the voting eligibility requirements 
complied with the constitutional amendments.50  After the 
election, a new Principal Chief was elected.51  Freedmen cast 
ballots, but their votes were not counted in the election 
results.52
In a suit by the Nation requesting declaratory and 
injunctive relief, a district court held that “the DOI has 
authority, pursuant to Article XIII of the Seminole 
Constitution, to approve amendments to the Nation’s 
Constitution before they could be adopted.”
 
53  Additionally, 
the district court held that “ ‘ the DOI is independently 
authorized pursuant to the Act of 1970 to approve or 
disapprove of amendments affecting the selection of the 
chief.’ ” 54  Since the DOI explicitly noted past membership in 
the Seminole Nation since the 1866 Treaty as the basis for its 





 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 122. 
 48. Id. at 125.  
 49. Id.  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. at 125–26.  
 53. Id. at 126. 
 54. Id.   
 55. Id. 
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An officer with the BIA subsequently sent the Seminole 
Nation a letter declaring that it refused to recognize the 
results of the election and would not restore a government-to-
government relationship with the Nation’s General Council 
until the Nation restored Freedmen representatives to the 
General Council.56  The Seminole Nation brought further 
action in federal court, alleging a violation of the 
Administrative Procedure Act.57  Exercising a highly 
deferential standard of review, the court in the second case 
concluded that the DOI did not act in an arbitrary, capricious, 
or otherwise illegal manner.58  The court cited the DOI’s 
authority to ensure that the Nation’s representatives are 
valid representatives of all members of the Nation.59  Thus, 
the court rejected the claim that the DOI violated the APA, 
and affirmed the DOI’s right to refuse to recognize the 
election results and engage in government-to-government 
relations.60
4. Tribal Sovereignty and Federal Control Over the 
Years 
  Ultimately, this case demonstrates only one of 
many examples of judicial deference to executive agencies in 
the realm of Indian affairs. 
Throughout the history of federal-tribal relations, each 
component of the Indian nation dynamic—distinct, 
independent sovereignty and Congress’ plenary power over 
Indian affairs—enjoyed periods of domination in Indian law.61  
In the early decades of the century, Indian law reflected the 
nineteenth century policy of allotment and assimilation.62  
Through broad and frequent use of the plenary power, as well 
as judicial support in cases such as Ex Parte Crow Dog,63 the 
United States sought to force Indians to substitute their 





 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 130.  
 58. Id. at 148. 
 59. Id. at 140.  
 60. Id. at 146–47.  
 61. Rubio, supra note 2, at 14.  
 62. Id. 
 63. Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca (Crow-Dog), 109 U.S. 556 (1883).  
 64. Rubio, supra note 2, at 14.  
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Frustration with these policies, however, helped 
engender the Indian New Deal in the 1930s.65  Academic and 
political leaders like Felix S. Cohen and John Collier, 
respectively, reestablished the right of tribal sovereignty by 
helping pass measures such as the Indian Reorganization Act 
of 1934 (IRA).66  The IRA, among other provisions, federally 
subsidized Indian economic activity, restored Indian lands, 
and reinstated Indian control over education.67  Most 
importantly, through tribal registration and incorporation 
with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the IRA ensured tribal 
self-determination and sovereignty.68  It was not until the 
Indian New Deal, and specifically, the IRA, that the 
government implemented the principle of inherent tribal 
sovereignty long established since the Marshall trilogy.69
The Indian New Deal shift in favor of a broad and 
expansive understanding of tribal sovereignty, however, did 
not last.  In the 1950s, Congress abruptly exercised its 
plenary power to withdraw all federal involvement and aid to 
Indian tribes.
 
70  This termination policy purported to endow 
Native Americans with “[f]reedom of action . . . as . . . full-
fledged citizen[s].”71  As Utah Senator Arthur Watkins 
announced, removing federal jurisdiction from the tribes 
altogether served to “end the status of Indians as wards of the 
government and grant them all of the rights and prerogatives 
pertaining to American citizenship.”72  Critics realized, 
however, that it was the federal protection itself that afforded 
tribes a means to maintain traditional ways of life.73  Despite 
these concerns, termination policies continued with passage 
of Public Law 280 in 195374
 
 65. Id. at 14–15.   
 and the 1954 statutory 
 66. Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–79 (2007); Rubio, supra 
note 2, at 15. 
 67. Rubio, supra note 2, at 15.  
 68. Id.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 15–16. 
 71. Arthur V. Watkins, Termination of Federal Supervision: The Removal of 
Restriction Over Indian Property and Person, 311 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 47, 49 (1957).   
 72. Id. at 55.  
 73. Rubio, supra note 2, at 16.  
 74. 83 Cong. ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 
1162 (2000)). 
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termination of the Menominee Indians of Wisconsin.75  
Discontent with these policies, in addition to concern for the 
future of tribal culture, lead to a demand for tribal self-
determination; this self-determination policy soon replaced 
the termination era of the 1950s.76
The Indian Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s not only 
reestablished what was destroyed under termination policies, 
but also further increased recognition of tribal self-
governance and sovereignty.
 
77  This emphasis on tribal self-
determination, along with the doctrine of tribal sovereign 
immunity lives on today. 78  Tribes have greater autonomy in 
many aspects of Indian governance, and the federal 
government is increasingly deferential to tribal 
determinations of membership and citizenship.79  While this 
current trend strengthens tribal sovereignty and 
independence,80
5. Civil Rights as Applied to Tribal Nations 
 it also creates the context for citizenship 
disputes such as those discussed in this Comment. 
Reflecting the fundamental principle of tribal 
sovereignty, the U.S. Constitution, as well as other civil 
rights legislation, does not apply directly to Indian tribes.81  
“As separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes 
have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those 
constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on 
federal or state authority.”82  Only treaties or acts of Congress 
can impose federal constitutional laws on tribal 
governments.83
 
 75. Menominee Indian Termination Act of 1954, 83 Cong. ch. 303, 68 Stat. 
250 (1954), repealed by Menominee Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 93-197, 87 Stat. 
770 (1973) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 903–903f (1994)). 
  While the federal government does not 
provide protections for individual tribal members against 
actions by the tribal government, the Indian Civil Rights Act 
(ICRA) grants tribal members statutory rights nearly 
 76. Rubio, supra note 2, at 16.  
 77. Id. at 16–17.  
 78. See id. at 18.  
 79. Id. at 17–18.  
 80. See id. at 17.  
 81. Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 678 (10th Cir. 1971). 
 82. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978). 
 83. Groundhog, 442 F.2d at 678. 
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comparable to the federal Constitution’s Bill of Rights.84
Utilizing its plenary powers, Congress enacted ICRA to 
prevent tribal governments from infringing on the civil rights 
of their tribal members.
 
85
The Department of Interior’s bill would, in effect, impose 
upon the Indian governments the same restrictions 
applicable presently to the Federal and State governments 
with several notable exceptions, viz., the 15th amendment, 
certain of the procedural requirements of the 5th, 6th, and 
7th amendments, and, in some respects, the equal 
protection requirement of the 14th amendment.
  As the Senate Subcommittee on 
the Judiciary notes: 
86
Should a tribal government violate ICRA, civil plaintiffs 




In spite of these statutory protections, aggrieved parties 
cannot bring suit in federal court against tribal governments 
 
 
 84. The ICRA affords tribal members the following rights: 
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall—(1) 
make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances; 
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue 
warrants, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or 
thing to be seized; (3) subject any person for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy; (4) compel any person in any criminal case to be 
a witness against himself; (5) take any private property for a public use 
without just compensation; (6) deny to any person in a criminal 
proceeding the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense; (7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel 
and unusual punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any 
one offense any penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for 
a term of one year and [or] a fine of $5,000, or both; (8) deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive 
any person of liberty or property without due process of law; (9) pass 
any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or (10) deny to any person 
accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the right, upon 
request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.  
25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2001) (footnote omitted).  
 85. See Thompson v. New York, 487 F. Supp. 212, 229 (N.D.N.Y. 1979). 
 86. Groundhog, 442 F.2d at 682. 
 87. Runs After v. United States, 766 F.2d 347, 353 (8th Cir. 1985). 
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for violating ICRA.88  As previously discussed, tribal 
governments still enjoy sovereign immunity from suit.89  The 
Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez90 that neither the legislative history 
of the ICRA nor the implicit implications of the Act itself 
suggested a private right of action for individual members 
against tribal governments.91
In Nero v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma,
 
92 the court 
reaffirmed tribal sovereign immunity as a defense in civil 
rights suits.93  Alleging violations of his right to vote in tribal 
elections and to participate in federal benefits programs, a 
Cherokee Freedmen brought suit in federal court.94  The court 
dismissed the claims based on sovereign immunity, 
concluding that the Cherokee Nation’s right to self-govern 
was purely an internal matter.95  Similarly, in Stroud v. 
Seminole Tribe of Florida,96 a Florida district court decided 
the plaintiff’s employment discrimination claim was 
precluded by sovereign immunity.97  Again, in Spotted Eagle 
v. Blackfeet Tribe of Blackfeet Indian Reservation,98 a district 
court reiterated tribal immunity from suit.99  The court 
dismissed the nine plaintiffs’ civil suit because an “ ‘ Indian 
person is subject to tribal law.’ ” 100
In these cases, various federal courts recognized that 
tribal courts are the proper venue for individual members’ 




 88. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Nero v. 
Cherokee Nation of Okla., 892 F.2d 1457 (10th Cir. 1989). 
  These suits rarely 
reach tribal courts, and even when they do, the tribal courts 
dismiss them, holding that tribal governments are immune 
 89. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 90. See generally Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. 49. 
 91. See id. at 61, 72. 
 92. Nero, 892 F.2d 1457. 
 93. Edwards, supra note 16, at 141.  
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. at 141–42.  
 96. Stroud v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 606 F. Supp. 678 (S.D. Fla. 1985). 
 97. Edwards, supra note 16, at 142.  
 98. Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe of Blackfeet Indian Reservation, 301 F. 
Supp. 85 (D. Mont. 1969).  The plaintiffs sought an injunction eliminating use of 
the tribe’s jail, as well as punitive damages.  Id. at 87. 
 99. Edwards, supra note 16, at 142.  
 100. Id. (quoting Spotted Eagle, 301 F. Supp. at 88).  
 101. See id. at 140.  
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from any federal civil rights guarantees, even the ICRA.102  
Therefore, in many instances, aggrieved members of the tribe 
are often left without a forum to redress violations of their 
civil rights.103
B. Native and Federal Control Over Tribal Membership 
 
Each tribe has the power to determine membership 
within its political community.104  Yet, as stated before,105 
Congress also has the authority to legislate in the area of 
tribal membership and has done so on multiple occasions.106  
Perhaps most significantly for the purposes of this Comment, 
the federal government, through treaty, required certain 
tribes to treat former slaves as tribal members.107  As 
previously mentioned, in certain cases, tribal constitutions 
themselves include provisions that require approval of 
constitutional amendments by the Department of the 
Interior.108  When the DOI finds that tribal membership laws 
underlying voter eligibility for an election violate the Indian 
Civil Rights Act or the tribe’s own constitution, the DOI often 
refuses to continue government-to-government relations with 
a tribe’s elected officials.109
1. Defining Native and Blood Quantum Requirements 
 
Differing definitions of the word Indian within federal 
legislation cause many of the problems associated with 
determining who is defined as an Indian for governmental 
purposes.110  As a result of these numerous and often 
conflicting definitions, some individuals are considered Indian 
for one purpose, but non-Indian for another.111  Under most 
circumstances, legislative definitions of an Indian are based 
on either tribal status or blood quantum.112
 
 102. Id.  
  In certain cases, 
 103. Id.  
 104. COHEN, supra note 11, at 212; see Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 
U.S. 49 (1978). 
 105. See supra Part I.A. 
 106. COHEN, supra note 11, at 213.  
 107. See 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 944 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 
1972).  
 108. COHEN, supra note 11, at 213 & n.80.  
 109. Id. at 213. 
 110. Williamson, supra note 8, 253.  
 111. See Brownell, supra note 40, at 277.  
 112. Id. at 278; Williamson, supra note 8, at 253. 
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the legislation lacks any definition at all.113
The federal government marked a long history of reliance 
on race to define Indian when it first enrolled Indian tribes 
with the passage of the General Allotment Act of 1887 (the 
Dawes Act).
 
114  Enrollment under the Dawes Act formalized 
tribal membership by cataloguing individuals into discrete 
racial categories, such as “Cherokee by blood,” “Minor 
Cherokees by Blood,” “Cherokee Freedmen,” or “Minor 
Cherokee Freedmen.”115  Most current federal and tribal 
policies similarly emphasize and rely upon race—through 
blood quantum requirements—to determine tribal 
membership.116  To be eligible for tribal membership or 
certain programs, requirements such as this demand that 
individuals prove a minimum degree of Indian ancestry.117  
The most common blood quantum degree is one-quarter.118
Blood quantum requirements derive from the “one-drop 
rule,” a form of American social classification that deemed 
any individual with one drop of black blood Black.
 
119  “ ‘ [T]he 
‘one-drop rule’ ensured that there would be more Black 
laborers for slavery’s human machine . . . blood quantum 
ratio[s] ensured that there would be more available land for 
White settlement and development.’ ” 120
 
 113. Brownell, supra note 40 at 278; Williamson, supra note 8, at 253 .  
  Because of 
intermarriage between tribes, it became increasingly difficult 
for Indians to meet blood quantum requirements, and as a 
 114. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 338 (1887) (codified in part in 
scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).  Also known as the Dawes Act, the General 
Allotment Act was an integral part of the United States’ broader late nineteenth 
century policy of assimilation and allotment.  See WILLIAM C. CANBY JR., 
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: IN A NUTSHELL 20–23 (4th ed. 2004).  These policies 
resulted in genocidal slaughter among the Lakota Sioux, and, as previously 
discussed, were supplanted by Indian New Deal Reforms.  See Rubio, supra note 
2 at 6 n.6.  
 115. S. Alan Ray, A Race or a Nation?  Cherokee National Identity and the 
Status of Freedmen’s Descendants, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 387, 391 (2007).  
 116. See Brownell, supra note 40, at 277; Sharon O’Brien, Tribes and 
Indians: With Whom Does the United States Maintain a Relationship?, 66 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1461, 1482–83 (1990).  
 117. See Brownell, supra note 40, at 280–81; O’Brien, supra note 116, at 
1489–90.  
 118. Williamson, supra note 8, at 254; see Brownell, supra note 40, at 280–81. 
 119. See Williamson, supra note 8 at 254. 
 120. Id. (quoting Tiya Miles, Uncle Tom Was an Indian: Tracing the Red in 
Black Slavery in CONFOUNDING THE COLOR LINE, 137 (James F. Brooks ed., 
2002).  
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result, just as difficult to make land ownership claims.121  
White policy makers used both methods of determining 
identity to increase their land ownership and remove as many 
obstacles to that growth as possible.122  Consequently, “Indian 
and Black identities are defined by methods that originated 
outside of both Indian and Black communities.”123
Critics identify multiple problems with the federal 
government and tribal governments’ use of blood quantum 
requirements to determine membership.
 
124  Some argue that 
by utilizing the blood quantum method, the federal 
government only supplies services and benefits to a portion of 
the population.125  For instance, the BIA uses blood quantum 
requirements to determine eligibility for federal benefits.126  
Critics find this problematic, especially considering the BIA’s 
disproportionate reliance on physical characteristics to 
determine an individual’s degree of Indian blood.127
Moreover, to some scholars, use of blood quantum 
requirements by tribal governments serve as a way for tribes 
to conveniently reduce the number of individuals with whom 
they must share limited resources.
 
128  One scholar explained 
that tribes’ decisions to rely on blood quantum requirements 
reflect the tribal struggle for survival.129  The scholar 
contends that they utilize this method to maximize wealth or 
gain political advantage.130  Of particular relevance to this 
Comment, other scholars and individuals are concerned that 
tribes use blood quantum requirements to exclude Blacks 
from membership.131  In sum, both tribal and federal power 
over tribal membership resulted in a system with racist roots, 
which has negative implications for marginalized and 
oppressed individuals in Indian tribes.132
 
 121. Id. 
 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id.  
 124. See id. at 254–55.  
 125. O’Brien, supra note 116, at 1490. 
 126. Brownell, supra note 40, at 288–92.  
 127. See id. at 288.  
 128. See generally id. at 309–12.  
 129. Id. at 309.  
 130. Id.  
 131. Williamson, supra note 8, at 255.  
 132. See id. at 253–57. 
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C. A Brief History of the Cherokee Freedmen 
African Americans began integrating into Indian tribal 
communities in the Antebellum South.133  Initially, as with 
other tribes, African Americans entered the Cherokee Nation 
as slaves or escaped slaves.134  African American participation 
and status in the tribal community varied greatly within the 
Cherokee Nation, as well as throughout all Indian tribes.135  
Despite these differences, most African Americans 
experienced a similar “political reality.”136  It was not until 
the close of the Civil War, with the passage of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 and postwar treaties between the tribe and the 
federal government, that African Americans enjoyed formal 
status as tribal members.137
all freedmen . . . liberated by voluntary act of their former 
owners or by law, as well as all free colored persons who 
were in the country at the commencement of the rebellion, 
and are now residents therein, or who may return within 
six months, and their descendants, shall have all the 
rights of native Cherokees.
  By the terms of the 1866 
Reconstruction Treaty with the United States: 
138
The Cherokee Nation subsequently amended its constitution 
to reflect the agreements of the Treaty.
 
139
Over the years, Freedmen enjoyed varying levels of 





 133. Rubio, supra note 2, at 5. 
  The 1975 adoption of a tribal constitution 
appeared to firmly establish the legal status of Freedmen in 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.  
 138. 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES, supra note 107, at 944. 
 139. Ray, supra note 115, at 390; see CONST. OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, art. 
III, § 5 (amended 1866) (hereinafter C.N.C.A).  The amendment used language 
similar to that of the Treaty providing that:  
All native-born Cherokees, all Indians, and [W]hites legally members of 
the Nation by adoption, and all freedmen who have been liberated by 
voluntary act of their former owners or by law, as well as free colored 
persons who were in the country at the commencement of the rebellion, 
and are now residents therein, or who may return within six months 
from the 19th day of July, 1866, and their descendants who reside 
within the limits of the Cherokee Nation, shall be taken, and deemed to 
be, citizens of the Cherokee Nation. 
Id.  
 140. See Edwards, supra note 16, at 124–27.  
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the Cherokee Nation.141  The constitution defined 
membership explicitly and exclusively based upon the Dawes 
Rolls.142  Despite this seemingly broad citizenship provision, 
the Tribal Council subsequently enacted more restrictive 
membership requirements, demanding proof of Cherokee 
blood.143  Moreover, since 1983, the Cherokee Nation has not 
allowed Freedmen to vote in the Nation’s elections.144
D. The Recent Disenrollment of Cherokee Freedmen 
 
Prior to the most recent 2011 Cherokee Nation Supreme 
Court decision focused upon in this Comment, an earlier case 
set in motion a series of events that culminated in the current 
Cherokee Freedmen controversy.145  In 2004, Lucy Allen sued 
the Cherokee Nation Tribal Council, the Tribal Registrar, and 
the Tribal Registration Committee, alleging that the blood 
quantum requirement of the Cherokee Nation Constitution 
was invalid because it was narrower than the 1975 
constitutional citizenship provision.146
In March of 2006, the Cherokee Supreme Court 
invalidated the Tribal Council’s more restrictive enrollment 
criteria, and held that Cherokee Freedmen were entitled to 
citizenship under the 1975 constitution.
 
147  The court based 
its decision on two main points.148  First, the court concluded 
that the 1975 Constitution did include the Freedmen as tribal 
members despite the lack of explicit reference to them.149
 
 141. See C.N.C.A, art. III, § 1 (1975).  This provision broadly defined 
membership as follows: “All members of the Cherokee Nation must be citizens 
as proven by reference to the Dawes Commission Rolls . . . .”  Id. 
  The 
court interpreted the 1975 Constitution to define citizenship 
based on reference to the Dawes Commission Rolls alone, 
 142. Ray, supra note 115, at 390–91.  
 143. See id. at 392.  As defined by the subsequent legislative acts, “[t]ribal 
membership is derived only through proof of Cherokee blood based on the Final 
Rolls.”  C.N.C.A. ch. 2, § 12(A). 
 144. Edwards, supra note 16, at 133.  
 145. See Rubio, supra note 2, at 6. 
 146. Id. at 7. 
 147. Allen v. Cherokee Nation Tribal Council, JAT-04–09 (Cherokee Nation 
Jud. Appeals Trib. 2006), available at http://www.cherokeecourts.org/Portals 
/73/Documents/Supreme_Court/Opinions/JAT-04-09%2054-Opinion%203-7-
06.pdf.  The court noted that “there is no express ‘by blood’ requirement for 
citizenship in the Constitution.”  Id. at 21.  
 148. See id. at 17–18. 
 149. Id. at 17. 
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which did not mandate any by blood requirement.150  Second, 
the court held that because the 1975 Constitution did not 
define membership in terms of blood quanta, the Tribal 
Council lacked the authority to further restrict citizenship 
requirements.151  According to the court, only a constitutional 
amendment voted upon by Cherokee Nation citizens could 
alter citizenship requirements.152  One estimate concluded 
that the court’s ruling made up to 45,000 individuals with 
Cherokee Freedmen ancestry eligible for Cherokee 
citizenship.153
It was soon after this decision that Cherokee political 
leaders mobilized and galvanized support for a referendum 
election on that precise issue.
 
154  Principal Chief Chad Smith 
expressed concern that the ruling could upset the political 
composition of the tribe.155  As a result of his efforts, the 
Tribal Council approved a petition for a tribal vote on a 
constitutional amendment that would require proof of 
Cherokee blood for citizenship.156  In October of 2006, the 
Cherokee Supreme Court held that there were enough 
signatures to hold a special election.157  On March 3, 2007, the 
amendment passed by an overwhelming majority (seventy-
seven percent).158
In August 2011, the Cherokee Nation Supreme Court 
upheld the referendum, rejecting the notion that the 1866 




 150. Id. 
  
 151. See id. 
 152. See id. at 20.  “If the Cherokee people want to change the legal definition 
of Cherokee citizenship, they must do so expressly.”  Id.  
 153. Ray, supra note 115, at 392.  
 154. See id.  at 392–93.  
 155. See id. at 392.  
 156. See id. at 393.  
 157. Order Determining the Numerical Sufficiency of the Signatures Counted 
by the Election Commission Concerning the Initiative Petition “Proposing an 
Amendment to Article IV, Section I of the Cherokee Constitution of 1999” and 
Article III, Section I of the Cherokee Constitution of 1975, SC-AD-06-06 
(Cherokee Nation Sup. Ct. 2006), available at http://www.cherokeecourts.org 
/Portals/73/Documents/Supreme_Court/Opinions/SC-AD-06-06.pdf.  
 158. Ray, supra note 115, at 393–94.  Freedmen granted citizenship after the 
2006 Cherokee Supreme Court decision were eligible to vote on the proposed 
constitutional amendment.  Id.   
 159. James MacKay, The Cherokee Nation Must be Free to Expel Black 
Freedmen, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 17, 2011, 7:00 AM), www.guardian.co.uk 
/commentisfree/2011/sep/17/cherokee-nation-black-freedmen. 
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Consequently, 2800 Cherokee Freedmen lost citizenship 
status, which means that they are no longer eligible to receive 
food aid and medical services.160  Furthermore, this decision 
significantly impacted the impending principal chief 
election.161  The previous election was too close to determine a 
winner, so on September 24, 2011, the Nation held a special 
election to settle the runoff between Chad Smith, the 
incumbent (who opposed Freedmen tribal membership), and 
opponent Bill John Baker.162  The exclusion of Freedmen 
votes potentially changed the results of the election.163
In response, the BIA threatened not to recognize the 
outcome of the election, which has the potential to lead to a 
constitutional crisis for the Cherokee Nation.
 
164  As Assistant 
Secretary for Indian Affairs Larry Echo Hawk wrote in a 
letter to acting principal chief Joe Crittenden: “The 
department’s position is, and has been, that the 1866 treaty 
between the U.S. and the Cherokee nation vested Cherokee 
freedmen with rights of citizenship in the nation, including 
the right of suffrage.”165  Furthermore, the U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development also took action, freezing 
thirty-three million dollars of funds.166
E. Tribal Sovereignty or Racial Justice? 
  This recent decision 
reignited conversations about the proper role of the federal 
government in Indian affairs.  
Scholarship and opinion on this issue seems to take one 
of two perspectives: either that tribal sovereignty preserves 
the right of the Cherokee Nation to expel black Freedmen, or 
that the disenrollment of Freedmen is an atrocious civil 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. See Lenzy Krehbiel-Burton, Cherokee Nation Court Terminates 
Freedmen Citizenship, TULSA WORLD (Aug. 23, 2011, 2:28 AM), 
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=11&articleid=20110823
_11_A12_TAHLEQ813989. 
 162. See Special Election for Cherokee Nation Chief Begins, REAL CLEAR 
POLITICS (Sept. 24, 2011), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/new/ap/politics 
/2011/Sep/24/special_election_for_cherokee_nation_chief_begins.html 
 163. MacKay, supra note 159. 
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. (quoting Letter from Larry Echo Hawk, Assistant Sec’y of Indian 
Affairs, to Joe Crittenden, Acting Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation (Sept. 
9, 2011)). 
 166. Id. 
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rights violation that calls for federal intervention.167  Those in 
favor of tribal self-determination argue that as a sovereign 
nation, the Cherokees should be free to “determine[] its 
citizenship by a Constitution approved by [its] people.”168  
These scholars and individuals emphasize that ancestry and 
clan define the essence of Cherokee identity.169  Therefore, 
they contend, the Cherokee Nation should be allowed to 
require documented lineal biological descendants from 
Indians by blood.170
Other individuals on this side of the debate support tribal 
sovereignty because they believe federal involvement will 
create more problems than it will solve.
 
171  Viewing federal 
response to the court decision as another attempt by the 
United States government to deny the Cherokee’s right to 
self-determination, supporters point to a line of failed past 
U.S. efforts as a warning of things to come.172  From the Trail 
of Tears cleansing to the destructive termination policies of 
the 1950s, these scholars posit that there is nothing to 
suggest that current federal intervention will have different 
results.173
Those opposing the Cherokee Nation decision to expel the 
Freedmen rely on principles of racial justice to justify their 
cause.
 
174  They argue that all societies with histories of 
slavery, including the Cherokee Nation, have an obligation to 
grant citizenship rights to former slaves and their 
descendants.175  Freedmen supporters claim that the 
Cherokee Nation cannot undo the 1866 Treaty that granted 
the former slaves citizenship.176
 
 167. See Tribal Rights vs. Racial Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/15/tribal-sovereignty-vs-racial-
justice. 
  They assert that tribal 
 168. Cara Cowan-Watts, It’s About Ancestry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/15/tribal-sovereignty-vs-racial-
justice/being-an-indian-its-about-ancestry. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See id. 
 171. See MacKay, supra note 159. 
 172. See id. 
 173. See id. 
 174. See Tiya Miles, Why the Freedmen Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/15/tribal-sovereignty-vs-racial-
justice/wjy-the-freedmen-fight. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See id. 
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governments cannot encroach upon Freedmen’s previously 
granted individual rights.177
Furthermore, opponents of the recent Cherokee Nation 
court decision assert that Indian tribes will not be able to 
exercise a strong form of sovereignty until non-Indians in 
their communities become a part of their membership and 
governance structure.
 
178  These scholars suggest that Indian 
Nations will be subjugated to federal intervention if they 
refuse to enfranchise Freedmen.179  They argue that factors 
such as cultural assimilation should be used to determine 
tribal citizenship.180  Ultimately, Freedmen supporters argue 
that the Cherokee Nation should not breach justice and 
continue racist membership policies.181
II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM 
   
 The plight of the Cherokee Freedmen poses an 
interesting and complex legal question: whether the expulsion 
of the Freedmen is a legitimate exercise of tribal sovereignty, 
or a reversion to the Jim Crow era that demands intervention 
by the federal government.  As previously discussed, the 
power to determine tribal membership is central to tribal 
independence and self-determination.182  Yet, this Native 
power is restrained; Congress and executive agencies, namely 
the DOI and BIA, regulate and oversee Indian affairs, even in 
the area of tribal membership.183  Despite the individual 
protections Congress enacted in ICRA, excluded Cherokee 
Freedmen are without recourse in tribal courts.184
 
 177. See Rubio, supra note 2, at 10.  
  Therefore, 
absent a sudden and unlikely change by the Cherokee Nation 
itself, any restoration of Freedmen citizenship will require 
further Congressional action.  Considering the turbulent 
history of federal regulation in the area of citizenship, this 
 178. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Weak Sovereign, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/15/tribal-sovereignty-vs-racial-
justice/cherokee-nation-underhanded-racial-politics (last updated Jan. 22, 
2013). 
 179. See id. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 183. See discussion supra Part I.A–B. 
 184. See supra Part I.A.5–B.1. 
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possibility is alarming to many.185
III. ANALYSIS 
  Ultimately, in this case, 
justice for the Cherokee Freedmen is in tension with the 
fundamental notion of tribal sovereignty. 
Under current law, the Cherokee Freedmen do not have 
an adequate remedy for their harm.  Absent contrary action 
by the Cherokee Nation itself, their exclusion from tribal 
membership stands.  The Cherokee Nation can invoke 
immunity from suit as an affirmative defense, which would be 
grounds for dismissal of any case brought by a Cherokee 
Freedman.186
Furthermore, Cherokee Freedmen cannot pursue a suit 
in tribal court under ICRA.
  This principle of law preserves Indian tribes’ 
independent decision-making power and ability to perform 
governmental functions, but in this instance, has the adverse 
effect of promoting racist policies. 
187  As already stated, these courts 
have a vested interest in protecting the sovereignty of the 
Cherokee Nation.188
In addition, though executive agencies can take certain 
actions, they cannot provide quick or satisfactory redress for 
the Cherokee Freedmen.  Since the Cherokee Nation is 
organized under the IRA, it must send any constitutional 
amendments to the BIA for approval.
  Moreover, considering that the Cherokee 
Nation Supreme Court upheld the constitutional amendment 
disenrolling the Freedmen, it is highly unlikely that the court 
would even hear an ICRA claim, and it is just as unlikely that 
the court would decide in favor of the Freedmen.  The court 
would be reluctant not only to reverse itself, but also to 
challenge the constitutional amendment approved 
overwhelmingly by the people.  Thus, neither federal nor 
tribal courts provide a forum for Cherokee Freedmen to seek 
redress. 
189  As in Seminole 
Nation v. Norton, the BIA could refuse to approve the recent 
amendment to the Cherokee Nation Constitution.190
 
 185. See supra Part I.E. 
  
Moreover, the BIA, as it did in Seminole Nation v. Norton, 
 186. Edwards, supra note 16, at 136.  
 187. See Runs After v. United States, 766 F.2d 347, 353 (8th Cir. 1985). 
 188. See Edwards, supra note 16, at 140.  
 189. Williamson, supra note 8, at 258.  
 190. See supra Part I.A.3. 
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could refuse to recognize the results of the election and cease 
government-to-government relations until Freedmen 
citizenship is reinstated.191  It is likely that, as in Seminole 
Nation v. Norton, federal courts would uphold BIA 
determinations.192
With facts similar to those of Seminole Nation v. Norton, 
it is likely that any BIA determinations would survive the 
three-step inquiry governing the judicial review of 
administrative decisions.
 
193  Since the Cherokee Constitution 
provides that the BIA has the power to approve constitutional 
amendments, the Secretary would certainly be acting within 
his authority.  In addition, acting to combat racist policies 
and encourage the Cherokee Nation to reinstate Freedmen 
citizenship is not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”194
While these BIA actions would be upheld by federal 
courts and eventually remedy the Freedmen’s plight, it would 
leave them without food aid and medical services until years 
of litigation came to an end.  Furthermore, these remedies 
would not address the ongoing trend among tribal nations to 
redefine membership in terms of blood quanta.  Thus, current 
actions available to executive agencies, though able to 
ultimately redress some of the Freedmen’s injuries, do not 
address the underlying issues of tribal identity and 
membership.  In conclusion, none of the current legal avenues 
for Cherokee Freedmen provide a just and adequate remedy 
for their grievances. 
  
Lastly, if the BIA acted as it did in Seminole Nation v. 
Norton, it would be following the necessary procedural 
requirements. 
IV. PROPOSAL 
Based on the complex nature of the federal-tribal 
relationship, as well as the turbulent and oppressive history 
between the Cherokee Nation and Cherokee Freedmen, no 
single solution will prove sufficient to solve the problem.  
Most fundamentally, the federal government should 
 
 191. See generally supra Part I.A.3. 
 192. See supra Part II. 
 193. See discussion supra Part I.A.3. 
 194. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2004). 
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reexamine the way it defines an Indian.  Blood quantum 
requirements derive from the federal classification methods 
that date back to the Dawes Rolls, and as long as the federal 
government continues to define Indian by racial means, the 
Cherokee Nation will likely follow suit.195
Cherokee Nation political leaders and tribal members 
further reinforce this lineage distinction by calling others to 
preserve the tribal political community by excluding the 
Freedmen.  In place of racial definitions, the federal 
government, as well as tribal nations, should redefine Indian 
using factors such as cultural and political assimilation.
  Because the 
Cherokee Nation, like other tribes, relies on federal 
definitions of Indian to qualify for aid and eligibility for 
programs, the tribe continues to perpetuate these racial 
categories. 
196
Until that shift occurs, Congress and the DOI should 
take practical steps to redress the Freedmen’s harm.  The 
BIA should act as it did in the Seminole Nation case, refusing 
to recognize the election results and engage in government-to-
government relations until the Freedmen’s citizenship status 
is reinstated.  Furthermore, Congress could strengthen the 
ICRA by adding a cause of action so that injured parties, such 
as the Freedmen, can seek recourse for civil rights violations 
in federal court. 
  
Ultimately, a paradigmatic shift in understandings of tribal 
identity is essential to solve the recurring problem of tribal 
membership determinations. 
Though these solutions may detract to some degree from 
tribal sovereignty, this further limitation on tribal self-
determination serves the greater purpose of ensuring racial 
justice, a subset of justice itself.  The fundamental unfairness 
here is that the Cherokee Freedmen are being deprived of a 
right to which they have a legitimate claim solely on account 
of their race.  While preserving the Cherokee Nation’s ability 
to determine membership in its tribe is an important aspect 
of the tribe’s right to self-determination, this autonomy 
should not extend so far as to promote racist policies and 
outcomes.  As previously mentioned, blood quantum 
requirements are archaic measures, used historically to 
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create artificial differences and promote racist laws, such as 
miscegenation statutes.197
CONCLUSION 
  Ultimately, even though extensive 
federal and congressional oversight would threaten tribal 
sovereignty, federal involvement is necessary to prevent 
racial injustice. 
In sum, the Cherokee Freedmen controversy serves as a 
microcosm for the greater struggle to strike a balance 
between tribal sovereignty and federal oversight.  Indian 
control over membership is the very essence of tribal 
independence.  Yet, when that definition relies on outdated 
blood quanta requirements and excludes individuals solely 
based on their race, justice calls for federal intervention; 
tribal sovereignty does not justify racist policies.  All the 
current legal avenues available to the federal government 
and its executive agencies, however, would not adequately 
address the Freedmen’s grievances or solve the greater 
problem of fairly defining Native identity.  Not only must the 
federal government get involved, but it must also redefine 
tribal membership in nonracial terms, which would have the 
effect of allowing and encouraging Native tribes to do the 
same.  Ultimately, it will not be until this paradigmatic shift 
occurs that controversies such as that of the Cherokee 
Freedman can truly be resolved and perhaps even prevented. 
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